Public sector controllership—reinventing the financial specialist as a countervailing power by ter Bogt, Henk et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Public sector controllership—reinventing the financial specialist as a countervailing power
ter Bogt, Henk; van Helden, G. Jan; van der Kolk, Berend
Published in:
Public Money & Management
DOI:
10.1080/09540962.2016.1194086
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2016
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
ter Bogt, H., van Helden, G. J., & van der Kolk, B. (2016). Public sector controllership—reinventing the
financial specialist as a countervailing power. Public Money & Management, 36(5), 379-384.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2016.1194086
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT JULY 2016
379
In response to allegations about public sector
organizations displaying bureaucratic, inside-
oriented and inefficient behaviours, New Public
Management (NPM) movements have
stimulated these institutions to operate in a
more efficient, ‘business-like’ manner. This has
resulted in the need for more autonomous and
stronger managers. In addition, driven by
innovations and novel accounting tools, such
as full cost pricing and performance budgeting,
‘controllers’ have been encouraged to take up
other roles as well, especially in the sphere of
management support.
In this article, we aim to enhance the
understanding of the different types of
controllers in public sector organizations. In
addition, we highlight the risk of a decline in
financial expertise and a less critical attitude
towards public sector activities due to an
overvaluation of the managerial aspects in the
work of controllers.
The roles of controllers
Controllers are professionals with primary
responsibilities for management accounting
(including budgeting, internal reporting, and
costing) and related activities (including
financial reporting and the development and
maintenance of the administrative systems
underlying management and financial
reporting functions). In describing employees
who perform these kinds of tasks, the term
‘management accountant’ is also used in the
literature (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005;
Byrne and Pierce, 2007). Various types of
controllers have been distinguished; they differ
in terms of their roles, additional tasks and
positions within an organization.
Sathe (1983), for example, distinguished
between two basic roles of a controller: (1) to
help managers in their business decision-
making; (2) to ensure that financial reporting
complies with certain standards. The first role
requires involvement with managerial
functions, whereas the second is more of a
‘book-keeper’ role (Hopper, 1980), demanding
a controller to be committed to the enforcement
of more or less objective accounting rules or the
directives as given by the top management of
the organization. More recent descriptions are
the ‘business advocate role’ and the ‘watchdog
or corporate policeman role’, respectively (see,
for example, Jablonsky et al. 1993; Yazdifar
and Tsamenyi, 2005). Granlund and Lukka
(1998) point to a continuum in the controller’s
roles, varying from score-keeping and bean-
counting, via watchdog, consultant, and
management advisor, to management team
member.
The changing functions and roles of
accounting do not only impact controllers but
also other professionals in organizations (see,
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for example, Caglio, 2003). Two trends have
been observed over time. On the one hand,
controllers have lost their monopoly as the
suppliers and users of accounting information,
as computer software reduces these ‘technical’
roles and accounting information is increasingly
being produced and (especially) used by non-
accounting professionals. On the other hand,
the spectrum of tasks as performed by
controllers has been expanded from merely
supplying accounting information to a wider,
more managerial and strategic position related
to the interpretation of data for managerial
purposes.
Hybridization
While prior studies have focused on the
differences in the roles of controllers, we aim to
shed more light on the differences in backgrounds
of, essentially, two types of controller:
•Pure controllers.
•Hybrid controllers.
The pure controller is a ‘real’ accounting
professional whose expertise and role are rooted
in subdisciplines such as management
accounting, financial accounting and
accounting information systems. The hybrid
controller combines content-knowledge of a
non-financial domain with expertise in
controller-specific areas (Järvinen, 2006).
Kurunmäki (2004) investigated the
‘hybridization’ of the controller’s function in
hospitals. She studied medical professionals
(doctors) in Finland who had expanded their
professional expertise with knowledge and tasks
from the field of management accounting, in
particular budgeting and the calculation of
costs and tariffs. These doctors had become
what could be described as ‘hybrid’ controllers.
Subsequent research by Järvinen (2006) showed
that the hybrid controller has a relatively strong
position in some hospitals, with the pure
controller acting as a sparring partner, educator
and information provider. However, in other
hospitals, the pure controller, who has a
traditional, strong background in finance and
business economics, was observed to be closely
and directly involved in the control of the
organization.
Kurunmäki (2004) and Järvinen (2006) see
hybridization as the enlargement of a non-
accounting function with ‘accounting expertise’.
However, other routes to hybridization are
also possible (Miller et al., 2008). The term
‘hybrid controller’ can, for instance, also refer
to professionals who were initially employed in
a ‘content-based’ function in which they gained
experience in one or more particular areas,
such as welfare or infrastructure, and then
incorporated this expertise into their current
function of controller. So, hybridization of the
controller’s function can be a combination of
accounting and content-related experiences
and educational backgrounds, while in a
broader sense it is the enlargement of an
accounting function by the inclusion of other
types of expertise. Moreover, apart from
expertise, personal skills also demarcate
hybridization, particularly concerning the
ability to collaborate and communicate with
non-accounting professionals.
As a consequence of public sector reforms,
the hybridization of the controller’s function
has increasingly gained momentum,
particularly by the influence of NPM-based
governance approaches and accounting tools
(Hood, 1995). Decentralized organizational
forms, a focus on outputs, more room for
managerial decision-making and new
accounting tools that increase the link between
resources and work content (as in performance
budgeting), require controllers to have at least
some basic understanding of the relationship
between inputs and outputs. This new context
calls for controllers who are able to support
managers in their daily activities. These
controllers have to be fully involved in the work
content of the organization and capable of
transferring accounting knowledge to non-
accounting colleagues.
Empirical evidence from The Netherlands
Given the limited body of research about the
roles of pure and hybrid controllers in public
sector and not-for-profit organizations, there
is a need for more evidence about these
controller types.
Based on the findings of a literature review
and interviews with controllers in the Dutch
public sector, we developed 10 statements
related to the preferences for either pure or
hybrid controllers in specific circumstances.
Using a five-point Likert scale (1 representing
strongly disagree and 5 representing strongly
agree), these statements formed part of a survey
that was sent to two groups of public sector
controllers in The Netherlands. The survey
yielded an overall response rate of 26% (N =
70). The first group consisted of members of
the Dutch association of controllers in the public
and non-profit sector (N = 45, response rate =
19.5%), and the other of participants in an
executive programme for public sector
controllers (N = 25, response rate = 62.5 %).
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Our analysis of the data from these surveys,
containing independent sample t-tests and
visual inspection, indicated no significant
differences between the responses of both
groups to the 10 statements. Therefore, we
combined their survey responses.
The first four statements discussed the
‘general qualities’ of both groups of controllers,
whereas the other six dealt with preferences
for either of the groups, given some
contingencies. For each of the statements, it is
indicated below how many respondents agreed
(or strongly agreed) with an item (scoring a 4 or
5 on the Likert scale).
Table 1 demonstrates that, in general, there
is much agreement among the respondents
regarding the supposed advantages and
disadvantages of the hybrid and the pure
controllers’ functions. Over 65% supported
statements 1, 3 and 4, indicating that our
expectations about the qualities and
backgrounds of the two types of controllers
were generally correct. However, statement 2,
referring to the expectation that pure
controllers are better at counter-balancing
pressure from colleagues, was only supported
by a minority (44.9%) of the respondents.
The preference for a pure or a hybrid
controller can depend on an organization’s
circumstances (or on those of an organizational
unit). Table 2 lists the respondents’ reactions to
the so-called ‘contingencies’ with respect to the
functions of the pure and the hybrid controller.
Generally, the respondents did not
acknowledge the expected preferences for pure
controllers in certain situations or environments
(less than 43% supported statements 5, 6 and
7). So, even in circumstances of financial distress
or when a better control of processes was
needed, a majority of the respondents did not
prefer a pure above a hybrid controller.
However, the contingencies in favour of the
hybrid controller were supported by more
than 62% of the respondents (statements 8, 9
and 10). This result indicates that whenever
the quality of the service provision has to be
improved, or the development of new markets
or services is considered important, hybrid
controllers are perceived to be more valuable
to the organization than their ‘pure’
counterparts. In general, our respondents
seemed to think that hybrid controllers were
better suited to address the challenges faced in
the public sector than pure controllers.
Reinventing the pure controller
The main finding of our survey among Dutch
public sector controllers was that the distinctive
characteristics of hybrid controllers and the
contingencies associated with this group are
widely acknowledged, but that favourable
qualities of pure controllers are contested. This
conclusion suggests that the respondents were
more ‘positive’ about hybrid controllers than
about pure controllers. But why is this the case?
This issue was not addressed in our survey,
but—based on interviews conducted prior to
collecting our survey data, as well as our own
experiences in the public sector and in teaching
courses for controllers—we can suggest some
answers to this question.
An obvious reason may be that it is
fashionable for professionals to extend the
boundaries of their original profession. The
idea that ‘we are all managers’ (Templar, 2011,
p. xiii), or that every professional should at
least to some extent be connected to managerial
functions and processes, is currently highly in
vogue. This guru-oriented view not only applies
to the function of financial specialist, but also to
engineers and other employees in
organizations. However, we think that such a
trend can also have a downside. In this case the
dwindling appreciation for the pure controller
Table 1. Statements regarding pure and hybrid controllers (‘agreed’ refers to the
respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement).
Pure controllers:
1. Have more profound expertise than hybrid controllers on financial issues (67.1% agreed)
2. Are more resistant to other pressures from organizational members because there is more distance
between them (44.9% agreed)
Hybrid controllers:
3. Have more expertise than pure controllers on the content of the work processes (69.6% agreed)
4. Communicate more easily with others within the organization because they have a better understanding
of the processes because of their background (78.6% agreed)
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may imply that organizations have come to
prefer ‘partners’ or ‘business advocates’ with a
broader view above pure controllers with more
indepth financial expertise. This development
could lead to a reduction of the input of financial
expertise in public sector decision-making,
which in turn could be harmful to organizations
in the public sector.
This scenario is particularly risky because
politicians and their public sector managers
are generally ambitious. This means, for
example, that they are often particularly eager
to realize projects that they consider important
and which make them visible to the citizens/
voters. Being ambitious can be regarded as a
positive driver, but it also carries risks. One of
these risks is that the people involved are so
strongly focused on realizing a project that
they tend to play down its possible drawbacks
or uncertainties. This happens in the private
sector, but also in the public sector, where the
precise effects of a specific policy or project are
often difficult to predict and measure.
Moreover, a comprehensive quantification in
financial terms, for example in the form of a
cost-benefit analysis or a net present value
calculation, is mostly very difficult to make in
the public sector. This situation can easily lead
to an overly optimistic presentation of new
projects. Examples in The Netherlands include
plans for new ice-skating stadiums and regional
airports, initiatives to build new museums and
theatres, and investments in business parks.
We observed that in such cases the possible
benefits tend to be overestimated and the costs
underestimated. Of course it is difficult to make
‘proper’ estimates about future numbers of
visitors or company profits. However, all too
often estimates of future revenues or benefits
are excessively high, while the uncertainties
and risks, including maintenance costs or re-
investments, are downplayed or even ignored.
No doubt this is due to wishful thinking, as well
as the need to show positive results.
The need to present positive results that
are ‘quantitatively underpinned’ is a problem
that may relate to NPM’s economic rationalism
and ‘economism’, as well as the ‘economization’
of society more in general (see, for example,
Cobb, 1999). Controllers—whether they are
hybrid or pure—cannot really influence this
economic trend. However, they could try to
avoid fuelling it by presenting a fair sketch of
the ‘facts’ and uncertainties, for example by
indicating that certain costs or revenues cannot
be measured in financial terms. Or they can
point out the difficulty of cost calculation over
a longer period of time. This requires financial
expertise, but also an attitude that combines
knowledge with independence and an
awareness of the complexities that surround a
project. Assessing these projects exclusively in
financial terms is thus not recommendable.
After all, some government initiatives may never
have been realized if there had been a need to
calculate their costs and show a positive ‘net
present value’. Examples are the investments
in drinking-water and sewerage systems in The
Netherlands since the second half of the 19th
century and the introduction of cable television
networks in the 1970s. So despite pressure to
show positive results, an unbiased report solely
containing pure facts and evidence, presented
by a financial controller who understands the
‘business’ and its uncertainties, is certainly more
desirable than the account of an ‘advocate’ or
‘spin-doctor’. Spin-doctors, specialized in
keeping up appearances, are generally not
Table 2. Contingencies and preferences for different types of controllers (‘agreed’ refers to
the respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement).
Pure controllers are preferred over hybrid controllers:
5. When an organization is in financial distress (35.7 % agreed)
6. When an organization’s focus is on controlling processes (29% agreed)
7. At an organization’s headquarters (42.6% agreed)
Hybrid controllers are preferred over pure controllers:
8. When an organization has to improve the quality of its services (62.9% agreed)
9. When an organization’s focus is on developing new markets and services (62.9% agreed)
10. In the public sector due to content-related issues being more important here than financial issues
(63.8% agreed)
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considered trustworthy. Therefore, this is not
a role a controller should be aiming for.
A combination of (financial) expertise and
an independent attitude is also important as a
countervailing power against the wishful
thinking of politicians or managers. Here a
clear focus on reporting ‘evidence’, i.e. giving
a fair and impartial picture of financial and
other issues in the short and long term, is
important. In this context, civil servants who
are specialized in the contents of the policy or
project concerned can be regarded as advocates.
Therefore, the controller should not have to
take that role; it is not his or her job to help get
the project realized. The controller’s role is
that of an unbiased assessor and critic, who
understands the ‘complexities of life’ and
focuses on the evidence. This role requires
(financial) expertise and an impartial and
independent attitude. Equipped with these
tools and competences, it could be helpful to
position controllers in the finance departments
of their organizations (where they would be
given direct functional connections with the
financial domain). In particular in larger
organizations, staffed by multiple work-
content specialists in various policy fields, a
strong independent—and, if necessary,
countervailing—power, i.e. a strong financial
controller could protect the organization from
making investments in projects based on
prognoses which are too optimistic.
This is not a plea for the controller to be a
financial watchdog, who simply rules ‘no’ if the
financial results are not positive, and who does
not (want to) understand that certain aspects
and uncertainties cannot be quantified. A
controller should certainly be able to assess
critically all of the benefits and costs in complex
programmes and projects, and this requires
expertise beyond financials. A controller also
needs to have an independent attitude, founded
in sound financial expertise. Furthermore, he
or she has to be able to manoeuvre and provide
financial-technical support within a landscape
of different interests and points of view, and
offer tailor-made financial-technical support if
necessary. It seems clear that a pure controller
is particularly welcomed, or tolerated, in times
of budgetary scarcity. However, in our opinion,
a controller who understands the complexities
that surround projects, and does not try to
polish them away, is always desirable. This
controller can function within the public sector
organization as a countervailing power.
Although it is not impossible, we doubt
whether hybrid controllers can play such a
‘countervailing’ role. They may lack the
financial expertise required for this task, but,
apart from that, since they are supposed to play
the role of ‘business advocate’ and are trained
to act as such, their position may make it
difficult for them to take a critical attitude
towards the politicians and managers and ask
them unwelcome questions. However, this
notion does not invalidate the findings of our
survey. In line with the popular view that the
controller has to be connected with
management, the results indicate that the
hybrid type seems to be regarded as more
suitable for public sector organizations.
Increasing public trust
Our plea for mobilizing countervailing powers
in public sector organizations is not meant to
stop politicians and public sector managers
from trying to realize their dreams and plans
for the future. On the contrary, ideas and
initiatives are undoubtedly needed. But if
powerful people surround themselves with ‘yes’
men and women, their organizations may
become unbalanced. With the risk of sounding
somewhat conservative: we think that a
controller with an independent attitude as
sketched above, could have a positive influence
on the general public’s support for public sector
organizations, particularly because this
controller is focused on critically scrutinizing
the future panoramas as sketched by the
politicians and managers. And this approach
may help win the public’s trust.
What are the implications of our plea to
reinvent the controller as a financial specialist?
In our view, the teaching programmes for
public sector controllers need some
reconsideration. In recent years, we have seen
(at least in The Netherlands) that these
programmes have become broader. This
means, for example, an increasing emphasis
on topics such as human and organizational
behaviour, strategic management, operations
management and various ‘soft controls’. The
widening of topics was considered necessary to
increase the communication skills of controllers
and improve their skills in taking up supportive
roles in the management and development of
their organizations.
Although we certainly do not deny the
value of these adaptations, they have come at a
cost. One consequence has been that the
‘technical’ knowledge of accounting and
financial management started to receive less
attention (this has also happened in the teaching
programmes for ‘real’ accounting
professionals). It is therefore time to refocus on
technical skills, i.e. the knowledge of (new)
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techniques and developments in the field of
accounting and financial management. But
apart from technical knowledge, what might
be even more important is a critical application
of the accounting techniques in complex
practical settings and, more generally, the
development of an independent attitude. These
issues could be taught, for example, by having
students work on advanced cases in which
specialist technical knowledge has to be
combined with (and forms the basis for) asking
questions and sound reasoning. In this way,
students could also be trained to present their
views in a clear and convincing manner. We
believe that it makes sense for public sector
organizations to employ financial specialists
who have a critical attitude. These controllers
can help in improving policy-making and, in
the longer term, in increasing citizens’ support
for the public sector.
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